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INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment's religion clauses read: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof ... ."I These sixteen vague words have spawned volumes upon
volumes of scholarly work and countless court battles. 2 The debates
surrounding these clauses tend to revolve around religious exemptions from
generally applicable laws, 3 religious symbols on government property,4
prayer in schools and other government-run institutions,5 and government

subsidies given to religious organizations. 6
* Assistant City Attorney, Civil Division, Mesa, Arizona. J.D., Sandra Day O'Connor
College of Law, Arizona State University. B.A., magna cum laude, Iowa State University.
1.
U.S. CONST. amend. I. Although, by its terms, the First Amendment purports to limit
only "Congress," the Supreme Court has long held that the First Amendment applies to the States
and local governments as well. See Eversonv. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
2.
For the definitive history of the Supreme Court's development of these clauses, see
generally Jesse H. Choper, A Century ofReligious Freedom, 88 CALIF. L. REV 1709 (2000).
3.
See, e.g., Emp. Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Sherbertv. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Philip A.
Hamburger, A ConstitutionalRight ofReligious Exemption: An HistoricalPerspective, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992); Megan Gibson, Note, Competing Concerns: Can Religious
Exemptions to MandatoryChildhood Vaccinationsand PublicHealth Successfully Coexist?, 54
U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 527 (2016).
4.
See, e.g., Am. Legionv. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2090 (2019) (allowing
a 40-foot "peace cross" to remain on government-owned property); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU
of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (removing the Ten Commandments from a Kentucky county
courthouse); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691-92 (2005) (allowing the Ten
Commandments to remain outside the Texas State Capitol); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU,
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989) (removing a nativity scene from
government-owned property, but allowing a menorah and a Christmas tree to remain on
government-owned property); Norman Dorsen & Charles Sims, The Nativity Scene Case: An
Errorin Judgment, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 837.
5.
See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 591-92 (2014) (allowing
chaplain-led prayers before town board meetings); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S.
290, 317 (2000) (disallowing student-led prayers before high school football games); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (disallowing a rabbi-led prayer at a graduation ceremony);
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (allowing chaplain-led prayer before the
Nebraska Legislature's sessions); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962) (disallowing
teacher-led prayer in school); Jonathan C. Drimmer, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Duty of
Public Schools to Limit Student-Proposed GraduationPrayers, 74 NEB. L. REV. 411 (1995);

Paul G. Kauper, Prayer, PublicSchools and the Supreme Court, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1031 (1963).
6.
See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 129 (2011)
(challenging an Arizona program that gave tax credits to parents who sent their children to
sectarian schools); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845-46
(1995) (requiring public universities to fund religious student groups in the same way they would
fund secular student groups); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624-25 (1971) (preventing the
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But there is an important First Amendment doctrine that has received
surprisingly little attention from scholars: the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine. Under this doctrine, civil courts cannot delve into matters that focus
on "theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or
the conformity of the members of a church to the standard of morals required
of them." More specifically, courts generally agree that they cannot (a)
consider employment disputes between a religious institution and its clergy,8
(b) resolve conflicts between different factions within a religious
organization, 9 (c) resolve property disputes that would require the court to

interpret religious doctrine,10 or (d) resolve contract disputes that involve
membership in a religious institution."l Inserting the court's secular values
into religious affairs, the rationale goes, would inject the "power of the state
into the forbidden area of religious freedom contrary to the principles of the
First Amendment."12

Courts, however, have split on two important issues concerning the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine: (1) whether the doctrine provides religious
officials with immunity from defamation suits when the allegedly defamatory
statement was made during a religious proceeding13 and (2) whether the
government from too heavily subsidizing or entangling itself with religious schools); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968) (allowing taxpayers to challenge government programs that
devoted federal funds to parochial schools); Rebecca E. Lawrence, Comment, The Future of
School Vouchers in Light of the Past Chaos of the Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 55 U.
MIA. L. REV. 419 (2001).

7.
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714
(1976) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733 (1871)).
8. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,
188-92 (2012); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94,
116 (1952); Gonzalez v. Roman Cath. Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929), abrogated
by Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Lewis v. Seventh Day Adventists Lake Region Conf., 978
F.2d 940, 941-42 (6th Cir. 1992).
9. See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709, 715-16; Watson, 80 U.S. at 726-27; Crowder v.
S. Baptist Convention, 828 F.2d 718, 726 (11th Cir. 1987).
10. See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709, 716; Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445-47 (1969).
11. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 716; In re St. Thomas High Sch., 495 S.W.3d 500, 508-14
(Tex. App. 2016) (holding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applied to a contract dispute
between a Catholic school and an expelled student).
12. Kedroff; 344 U.S. at 119.
13. Compare Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 392-93, 396 (6th Cir. 1986)
(dismissing a Methodist minister's defamation claim against a Methodist bishop and his three
subordinates), and O'Connor v. Diocese of Honolulu, 885 P.2d 361, 371 (Haw. 1994)
(dismissing excommunicated publisher's defamation claim against The Diocese of Honolulu, its
bishop, and its judicial vicar), and Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 773 N.E.2d 929, 93538 (Mass. 2002) (dismissing Episcopal priest's defamation suit against diocese, diocesan
officials, and author of letter accusing him of adultery), and Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical
Lutheran Church of the Unaltered Augsburg Confession, 877 N.W.2d 528, 530 (Minn. 2016)
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doctrine prevents religious institutions from being sued for negligently hiring,
retaining, or supervising members of their clergy.' 4

On the former issue, at least three state supreme courts and the Sixth
Circuit have held that religious officials cannot be sued for defamation if the
statement at issue was made during a religious proceeding,' 5 while five other
state supreme courts (including the District of Columbia) and the Eighth
Circuit have reached the opposite conclusion.1 6 On the latter issue, several
state and federal courts have also reached diverging conclusions.' 7 The
Supreme Courts of Missouri and Wisconsin, for example, have held that
religious institutions cannot be sued for the negligent hiring and retention of
a clergy member because the tort would necessarily require courts to evaluate
whether the institution's practices were "reasonable."' 8 The Supreme Courts
of Florida and Colorado, on the other hand, have held that religious
institutions can be sued for the negligent hiring and retention of clergy

(dismissing parishioners' defamation suit against church and its pastors), with Drevlow v.
Lutheran Church, 991 F.2d 468, 471-72 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding First Amendment did not bar
a minister's libel claim against church where church offered no religious explanation for its
actions which might entangle district court in religious controversy), and McAdoo v. Diaz, 884
P.2d 1385, 1390-91 (Alaska 1994) (holding there was no constitutional bar to church volunteer's
defamation claim against pastorbecause it did not implicate religious questions), andLipscombe
v. Crudup, 888 A.2d 1171, 1173-74 (D.C. 2005) (holding constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom did not shield pastor from allegations of tortious secular behavior), and Connor v.
Archdiocese of Phila., 975 A.2d 1084, 1113 (Pa. 2009) (holding that the judicial deference rule
did not apply at the pleading stage to defamation claims brought by parents of parochial
elementary school student against school and school officials), andBanks v. St. Matthew Baptist
Church, 406 S.C. 156, 158, 750 S.E.2d 605, 606 (2013) (holding allegedly defamatory
statements of pastor at congregational meeting were independent of religious doctrine or
governance), and Bowie v. Murphy, 624 S.E.2d 74, 79-80 (Va. 2006) (holding deacon's
defamation claims did not involve matters of church governance).
14. Compare Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246-47 (Mo. 1997) (refusing to
adjudicate son and parents' claims of negligent hiring, retention, and failure to supervise priest),
and Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 782 (Wis. 1995) (holding First
Amendment barred action against archdiocese for negligent hiring, retention, training, or
supervising priest), with Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320-21 (Colo. 1993) (holding
First Amendment did not bar claims of negligent hiring supervision against Episcopal dioceses
and bishop), and Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 360-61 (Fla. 2002) (holding claims of
negligent hiring and supervision asserted by parishioners against church and archdiocese were
not barred by Free Exercise Clause because claim was based on neutral application of principles
of tort law).
15. See Hutchison, 789 F.2d at 395; O'Connor, 885 P.2d at 371; Hiles, 773 N.E.2d at
937; Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 542.
16. See Drevlow, 991 F.2d at 4471; McAdoo, 884 P.2d at 1390; Lipscombe, 888 A.2d at
1174; Connor, 975 A.2d at 1113; Banks, 406 S.C. at 158, 750 S.E.2d at 606; Bowie, 624 S.E.2d
at 79.
17. Compare Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 246-47, and Pritzlaff, 533 N.W.2d at 782, with
Moses, 863 P.2d at 320-21, and Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 360-61.
18. Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 247-50; Pritzlaff; 533 N.W.2d at 790-91.
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members because these issues can be decided through a neutral application of
tort principles.19

This Article argues that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine should not
immunize religious institutions or their officials from the torts of defamation
or negligent hiring, retention, or supervision. Part II of the Article summarizes
the history of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine-with particular emphasis
on lower courts' application of this doctrine to the torts of defamation and
negligent employment practices. Part III argues that this doctrine does not

prevent religious institutions from being sued for defamation, especially
where the defamatory statement is demonstrably false and harmful. Part IV
argues that this doctrine does not prevent religious institutions from being
sued for negligently hiring, retaining, or supervising their clergy, especially

in cases involving child molestation. Finally, Part V addresses likely
counterarguments to this Article.
Religious freedom is undoubtedly a bedrock principle in our
constitutional democracy. But a religious affiliation is not a license to sin.
"The mere possession of religious convictions," after all, "does not relieve the
citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities." 20 My hope is that this
Article will provide a solid rationale for treating religious institutions and
religious officials equally under the law.
II.

THE HISTORY OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL ABSTENTION DOCTRINE

This Section proceeds in two subsections. Section II.A provides a history
of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine as announced by the Supreme Court,
beginning with 1871's Watson v. Jones and ending with 2020's Our Lady of
Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru. Section II.B discusses the current

jurisdictional split among the lower courts on whether the doctrine prohibits
suits against religious institutions for defamation and negligent employment
practices.
A.

Supreme CourtPrecedent

The ecclesiastical abstention rule, of course, cannot be found in the First
Amendment's text; it is a court-created doctrine meant to prevent the judiciary
from inserting itself into religious affairs. 21 The Supreme Court first laid the
foundations for this doctrine in 1871 in Watson v. Jones.22 There, the Court

19. Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 360-61; Moses, 863 P.2d at 320-21.
20. Emp. Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting
Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940)).
21. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (1871).
22. See id.
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was presented with a dispute between the pro-slavery and anti-slavery factions
in Louisville's Walnut Street Presbyterian Church.23 Each faction claimed it
had the right to the "exclusive use" of the church and its property. 24 The
church's general assembly formally recognized the anti-slavery faction as the
rightful owners of the church property, at which point the pro-slavery faction
filed suit to reclaim its property rights. 25
Citing the "broad and sound view of the relations of church and state
under our system of laws," the Watson Court refused to rule on the case and
instead deferred to the judgment of the church's general assembly. 26 The
Court held that "whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or
ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of [the]
church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals
must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them .... "27
The Watson Court did not root this doctrine in the First Amendment.28
Rather, the Court's opinion focused on public policy, the common law, and
the "preponderating weight of judicial authority" that existed at the time. 29 It
was not until 1952, in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, that the Court

constitutionalized the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. 30 Kedroff also
concerned a church-related property dispute-this time revolving around the
right to use a Russian Orthodox cathedral in New York City. 31New York's
Religious Corporations Law sought to transfer the cathedral's ownership from
the Moscow-based patriarchy to the American-based patriarchy.3 2 The
Kedroff Court struck down this statute because it sought to transfer church
property to a group that was not entitled to that property under the church's
interpretation of canonical law. 33
Kedroff reaffirmed Watson, noting that religious institutions enjoy

"independence from secular control or manipulation," specifically "[the]
power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church
government as well as those of faith and doctrine." 3 4 But, unlike the Watson
Court, the Kedroff Court rooted its decision in the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.3 5 "Freedom to select . . clergy," the Court held,
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See id. at 684.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 685.
Id. at 727.
Id.
See id.
Id.
344 U.S. 94, 115-16 (1952).
Id. at 95-96.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 107, 119.
Id. at 116.
See id. at 107, 115-16.
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"must . . have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise
of religion against state interference." 36
Similarly, in PresbyterianChurch v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
PresbyterianChurch, the Court noted that "[s]pecial problems arise ... when

[property] disputes implicate controversies over church doctrine and
practice." 37 Although the states have a legitimate interest in resolving churchbased property disputes and though the civil courts are the proper venue for
that resolution, the Blue Hull Court noted that the First Amendment is "plainly
jeopardized" when litigation turns on religious doctrine and practice. 38 As
such, the Court blocked the lower courts from determining whether a church's
decision "depart[ed] . . . from [its] doctrine." 39

The Court next addressed the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,40 the most frequently cited case in

this area of law. 41 There, the Serbian Orthodox Church stripped Dionisije
Milivojevich of his title of bishop and excommunicated him from the church,
largely due to his defiance of the church hierarchy.42 Following his removal,
Milivojevich brought suit in Illinois state court seeking reinstatement.43 The
Illinois Supreme Court eventually reinstated Milivojevich, finding that his
removal violated church laws and regulations. 44
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the First Amendment
"permit[s] hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules and
regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals for
adjudicating disputes over these matters." 45 The Court went on to note that
when church tribunals resolve an ecclesiastical dispute, "the Constitution
requires that civil courts accept their decisions as binding upon them." 46 In
Milivojevich, because the state court probed into whether the church had
followed its own procedures, it had "unconstitutionally undertaken the
36. Id. at 116.
37. 393 U.S. 440, 445 (1969).
38. Id. at 449.
39. Id. at 449-50.
40. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
41. See, e.g., Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, 991 F.2d 468, 470-71 (8th Cir. 1993);
Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 394 (6th Cir. 1986); Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d
310, 320 (Colo. 1993); Lipscombe v. Crudup, 888 A.2d 1171, 1172 (D.C. 2005); Malicki v.
Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 355-56 (Fla. 2002); O'Connorv. Diocese of Honolulu, 885 P.2d 361, 384
(Haw. 1994); Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Unaltered Augsburg
Confession, 877 N.W.2d 528, 533 (Minn. 2016); Gibsonv. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo.
1997); Connor v. Archdiocese of Phila., 975 A.2d 1084, 1094 (Pa. 2009); Westbrook v. Penley,
231 S.W.3d 389, 398 (Tex. 2007).
42. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 706.
43. Id. at 706-07.
44. Id. at 708.
45. Id. at 724.
46. Id. at 724-25.
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resolution of [a] quintessentially religious controvers[y] whose resolution the
First Amendment commits exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical
tribunals... ."47

Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented in Milivojevich.48
Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court's "rubber-stamp" approach to
deciding ecclesiastical issues conflicted with the Establishment Clause. 49 If

the judiciary is always required to side with a church's decision, he argued, it
is unconstitutionally "placing its weight behind a particular religious belief,
tenet, or sect." 5 0 As long as courts apply "neutral principles of law" when
deciding

religious

controversies,

Justice

Rehnquist

argued,

the

First

'

Amendment is not offended. 5

Three years later, in Jones v. Wolf, the Supreme Court bent toward Justice

Rehnquist's rationale. 52 In Jones, the Court remanded a church-based property
dispute to the lower court to determine whether the case could be decided
without reference to religious doctrine. 53 Courts may hear church-related

disputes, the Jones Court held, so long as they rely upon "neutral principles
of law" when deciding the case and "take special care to scrutinize [church]
document[s] in purely secular terms . . ."54 Though courts are forbidden from
answering "questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice" that are
outside their judicial expertise, if the case turns on "objective, wellestablished" legal principles that have long been "familiar to lawyers and
judges," courts are free to hear the case. 55
After Jones, the Court largely refrained from hearing ecclesiastical
immunity cases. In 2012, however, the Court stepped back into the fray in
Hosanna-TaborEvangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC.56 There,

the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) contains a "ministerial exception," whereby religious organizations
47. Id. at 720.
48. Id. at 725-35 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 734 ("To make available the coercive powers of civil courts to rubber-stamp
ecclesiastical decisions of hierarchical religious associations, when such deference is not
accorded similar acts of secular voluntary associations, would, in avoiding the free exercise
problems petitioners envision, itself create more serious problems under the Establishment
Clause.").
50. Id. at 733.
51. Id.
52. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
53. Id. at 608-10.
54. Id. at 604.
55. Id. at 603.
56. 565 U.S. 171 (2012). Although this decision does not address the "ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine" per se, it falls within the same ideological framework. See Douglas
Laycock, Hosanna-Tabor and the MinisterialException, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 839, 853
(2012) ("The Court's opinion in Hosanna-Taboris a sweeping and unanimous reaffirmation of
the earlier [ecclesiastical abstention] cases, particularly Watson, Kedroff, and Milivojevich.").
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cannot be held liable for terminating a clergy member because of an ADAprotected disability.5 7 In Hosanna-Tabor,a Lutheran elementary school fired
one of its minster-teachers after she was diagnosed with narcolepsy. 58 The
minister-teacher filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging she was terminated
because of an ADA-protected disability. 59
On appeal, the Court held that the First Amendment carves out a
"ministerial exception" to the ADA that "precludes application of such
legislation to claims concerning the employment relationship between a
religious institution and its ministers." 60 In reaching its decision, the Court
noted:
The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their
ministers. Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted
minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon

more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes with
the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control
over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By imposing
an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause,
which protects a religious group's right to shape its own faith and
mission through its appointments. According the state the power to
determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates
the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement
in such ecclesiastical decisions. 61
In this passage, the Court, for the first time, rooted the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine in both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause.62 Prior to Hosanna-Tabor,it was unclear whether this doctrine was

derived from the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, or some
57. Hosanna-Tabor,565 U.S. at 188-92.
58. Id. at 178-79.
59. Id. at 179.
60. Id. at 188. Critics of the ministerial exception argue that virtually no religious sect
teaches or sincerely believes that disabled individuals should not be ministers or clerics;
therefore, it makes no sense to exempt them from an anti-discrimination law that is consistent
with their beliefs. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionalityof the
MinisterialExemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1965, 2031 (2007)
("Religious organizations whose beliefs are consistent with the goals of [an anti-discrimination
law], or even silent on the issue of discrimination, cannot complain that compliance interferes
with their expression."). Proponents of the ministerial exception, on the other hand, argue that a
church's ability to select its clergy should be robustly protected and that a church's decision to
hire, retain, or terminate a cleric should not be reviewable by the civil courts. See, e.g., Laycock,
supra note 56, at 850-51.
61. Hosanna-Tabor,565 U.S. at 188-89.
62. See id.
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combination thereof 63 When invoking the doctrine, the Court often spoke in
terms of free exercise-which is unsurprising given that the doctrine is meant
to allow religious institutions to organize and govern themselves as they see
fit. 64 But the Court also made numerous references to the "entanglement" of
church and state, a classic Establishment Clause buzzword. 65 After 140 years,
the Court finally (sort of) cleared up the confusion.66
In Hosanna-Tabor, the plaintiff was a minister as well as a teacher,

making the ministerial exception clearly applicable. 67 In December 2019,
however, the Court granted certiorari in a pair of Ninth Circuit cases, Biel v.
St. James School and Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe School, to

determine whether this ministerial exception applies to religious school
teachers who are not ministers. 68 In both cases, the Ninth Circuit concluded

the plaintiffs' lawsuits could proceed because they were simply "teachers"
and not "minister-teachers," as seen in Hosanna-Tabor.69

In Biel, Kristen Biel was fired from her job as a fifth-grade teacher "after
she told her employer that she had breast cancer and would need to miss work
to undergo chemotherapy." 7 0 Biel subsequently filed an ADA suit against her
employer, St. James Catholic School. 7 ' The district court granted the school's
motion for summary judgment, finding that Biel's suit was barred by the
ministerial exception announced in Hosanna-Tabor.72 On appeal, the Ninth

Circuit reversed and found that the ADA's ministerial exception did not apply
to Biel because (1) she did not have any religious credentials, religious
training, or a ministerial background; (2) she was not held out to the public as
a religious minister or leader; and (3) her employment title was "teacher," not
"minister."7 3
In July 2020, in Morrissey-Berru, the Court reversed these rulings and

held that the ministerial exception extends to all church employees who
further the church's mission or inculcate its religious values-as each of these
teachers did.74 "What matters, at bottom, is what an employee does," the Court
63. See Christopher R. Farrell, Note, Ecclesiastical Abstention and the Crisis in the
Catholic Church, 19 J.L. & POL. 109, 116 (2003).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Hosanna-Tabor,565 U.S. at 188-89.
67. Id. at 192.
68. Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 607 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct.
680 (2019); Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App'x 460, 460 (9th Cir.
2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 679 (2019).
69. Biel, 911 F.3d at 605; Morrissey-Berru,769 F. App'x at 461.
70. Biel, 911 F.3d at 605.
71. Id. at 606.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 608.
74. 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2066-69 (2020).
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reasoned. 75 And in these cases, the teachers educated youth in line with their
church's teachings, inculcated religious values in their students, and trained
students to live their lives in accordance with a particular faith.76 Although
these teachers were not "ministers," as seen in Hosanna-Tabor,they still fell
into the category of religious employees who were subject to the ministerial
exception and thus not protected by anti-discrimination laws.77
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch would have gone a step further. 78 In
addition to exempting these teachers from the ADA's protections, they also
maintained that "the Religion Clauses require civil courts to defer to religious
organizations' good-faith claims that a certain employee's position is
'ministerial."' 79 In other words, if a religious organization claims that an
aggrieved employee is a "minister" of its faith, courts should presume this
employee falls into the ministerial exception. 80 "This deference is necessary,"
Justice Thomas argued, "because . . judges lack the requisite 'understanding
and appreciation of the role played by every person who performs a particular
role in every religious tradition."' 8' "What qualifies as 'ministerial' is an
inherently theological question, and thus one that cannot be resolved by civil
courts through legal analysis."8 2
Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg, on the other hand, dissented, arguing
that the majority's "simplistic approach ha[d] no basis in law and strip[ped]
thousands of schoolteachers of their legal protections," 83 not to mention "the
rights of countless coaches, camp counselors, nurses, social-service workers,
in-house lawyers, media-relations personnel, and many others who work in
religious institutions." 84 "[B]ecause the Court's new standard . . appears to
deem churches in the best position to explain [whether the plaintiff is a
'minister'], one cannot help but conclude that the Court has just traded legal
analysis for a rubber stamp." 8 5 "[T]he Court's apparent deference here
threatens to make nearly anyone whom [religious] schools might hire
'ministers' unprotected from discrimination in the hiring process. That cannot
be right." 8 6

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 2064.
Id. at 2066.
Id.
See id. at 2070 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 2069-70.
Id.
Id. at 2070.
Id.
Id. at 2072 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2082.
Id. at 2076.
Id.
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Other State Court and Lower FederalCourtDecisions

Watson, Kedroff, and Milivojevich illustrate that "[t]he ecclesiastical

abstention doctrine's practical application requires a court to either abstain
from fact-finding issues that are based on religious doctrine or church
governance, or defer to the decisions handed down by the church leadership
or hierarchical authority."?7 The Supreme Court's decisions in this area, for
the most part, have all involved church-related employment or property
disputes. 88 The lower courts, however, have applied this doctrine to many
other situations-most significantly, to defamation and negligent employment
practices. 89

1.

Defamation

Courts are sharply divided on whether the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine immunizes religious officials from defamation suits when the
allegedly defamatory statement was made during a religious proceeding. The
concern is that if defamation suits are allowed to proceed, the judiciary will
be getting itself into the business of determining whether the declarant's
religious beliefs are true or false. 90
In O'Connor v. Diocese of Honolulu, for example, the Hawaii Supreme

Court held that religious officials have a general immunity from defamation
suits if their allegedly defamatory statement was made during a religious
proceeding. 9 1 In O'Connor, the plaintiff ran a private newspaper that often

criticized his diocese's bishop. 92 In response to several of the plaintiff's
publications, the bishop wrote the plaintiff a letter threatening to
excommunicate him from the church unless he ceased publication. 93 The
plaintiff continued to print his paper and was, as promised,

87. Dan Knudsen, Note, Wrestling with the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine:
How Puskarv. Krco FurtherComplicatedthe Heavily LitigatedHistoryof the Serbian Orthodox
Church in America, 36 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 139, 139 (2015) (emphasis altered).
88. See, e.g., Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. at 2069 (majority opinion); Jones v. Wolf, 443
U.S. 595 (1979).
89. See Constance Frisby Fain, Annotation, Defamation of Church Member by Church
or Church Official, 109 A.L.R. 5th 541 (2003); Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Liability of
Church or Religious Organizationfor Negligent Hiring, Retention, or Supervision of Priest,
Minister, or Other Clergy Based on Sexual Misconduct, 101 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2002).
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558(a) (AM. L. INST. 1977) (stating that to
succeed on a defamation claim, the plaintiff must show, among other things, that the defendant's
statement was false).
91. 885 P.2d 361, 368 (Haw. 1994).
92. See id. at 362.
93. Id.
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excommunicated. 94 The plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in Hawaii
state court alleging that he was defamed during his excommunication
process.95
On appeal, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that courts cannot entertain
defamation suits against religious institutions or officials if the allegedly
defamatory statements were made during a religious proceeding. 96 "[T]o
determine the truth or falsity of the statements," the court reasoned, "a state
court would have to inquire into church teachings and doctrine." 97 Because
church-related defamation suits often turn on "determining doctrinal
correctness" or "analyzing church law," the court held that the "adjudication
of [these types of cases] is clearly beyond the purview of civil courts." 98
Similarly, in Ausley v. Shaw, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that
church officials cannot be sued for statements made "during the course of an
ecclesiastical undertaking." 99 To the Ausley court, statements made during
inherently religious proceedings-such as proceedings regarding the
discipline or removal of a church member-are "too close to the peculiarly
religious aspects of the [church]" and cannot be treated as "simple civil
wrongs."

00

Other jurisdictions, however, have reached the opposite conclusion.' 0' In
Banks v. St. Matthew Baptist Church, for example, the South Carolina

Supreme Court held that courts can hear defamation suits against church
officials if the case can be "resolved entirely by neutral principles of law." 0 2
When a defamation suit revolves around "simple declarative statements," the
court reasoned, "[t]he truth or falsity of such statements can easily be
ascertained by a court without any consideration of religious issues or
doctrines."1 03 Accordingly, courts can hear these cases because they do not
involve "issues of religious law, principle, doctrine, discipline, custom, or

94. Id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 368.
97. Id. (footnote omitted).
98. Id.
99. Ausley v. Shaw, 193 S.W.3d 892, 895 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
100. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tidman v. Salvation Army, No. 01A-01-9708-CV00380, 1998 WL 391765, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 1998)).
101. See, e.g., Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, Mo. Synod, 991 F.2d 468, 471-72 (8th Cir.
1993); Kavanagh v. Zwilling, 997 F. Supp. 2d 241, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding defrocked
Catholic priest's libel per se claim was barred by the First Amendment, but also holding that his
claims of libel by implication and libelper quod were not barred); Banks v. St. Matthew Baptist
Church, 406 S.C. 156, 158, 750 S.E.2d 605, 606 (2013) (holding trial court had jurisdiction to
resolve defamation claim against pastor).
102. 406 S.C. at 160, 750 S.E.2d at 607.
103. Id. at 161, 750 S.E.2d at 607.

Published by Scholar Commons,

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5
38

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 72: 25]

administration."104 "To find otherwise," the Banks court concluded, "would
be to grant tort law immunity to religious practitioners, enabling them to make
any statement regardless of its falsity and harmfulness provided the statement
is made in a religious setting." 0 5
The rationales in these cases accurately illustrate the current divide among
courts on this issue. Courts that disallow defamation suits arising out of church
proceedings are concerned that opening the door to such suits would give
courts license to examine the truth or falsity of religious beliefs. Courts that
allow defamation suits, on the other hand, highlight that these cases can almost
always be resolved through neutral and generally applicable tort principles.
The following jurisdictions have disallowed defamation suits concerning
statements made during a religious proceeding:
" Hutchinson v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1986).
"

Yaggie v. Indiana-Kentucky Synod EvangelicalLutheran Church

"
"
"
"

in America, 860 F. Supp. 1194 (W.D. Ky. 1994).
Higgins v. Maher, 258 Cal. Rptr. 757 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
O'Connor v. Diocese ofHonolulu, 885 P.2d 361 (Haw. 1994).
Stepek v. Doe, 910 N.E.2d 655 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
Purdum v. Purdum, 301 P.3d 718 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013).

"

Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 683 A.2d

808 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
"

Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts, 773 N.E.2d 929

(Mass. 2002).
"

Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of the

"

UnalteredAugsburgConfession, 877 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 2016).
Brady v. Pace, 108 S.W.3d 54 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).

"

Howard v. Covenant Apostolic Church, Inc., 705 N.E.2d 385

(Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
" Ausley v. Shaw, 193 S.W.3d 892 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
The following jurisdictions have allowed defamation suits concerning
statements made during a religious proceeding:
"

"
"
"
"

Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, 991 F.2d 468 (8th

Cir. 1993).
McAdoo v. Diaz, 884 P.2d 1385 (Alaska 1994).
Lipscombe v. Crudup, 888 A.2d 1171 (D.C. 2005).
Connor v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 975 A.2d 1084 (Pa.
2009).
Banks v. St. Matthew Baptist Church, 406 S.C. 156, 750 S.E.2d
605 (2013).

104. Id.
105. Id. at 163, 750 S.E.2d at 608.
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* Bowie v. Murphy, 624 S.E.2d 74 (Va. 2006).
There is a sharp divide among courts on this issue. Given this obvious
confusion and lack of guidance, the Supreme Court should step in and clarify
whether the First Amendment immunizes church officials from defamation
suits when the allegedly defamatory statement was made during a church
proceeding. Part II of this Article argues that when the Court (finally) decides
to hear this issue, it should hold that the First Amendment does not immunize
these officials in most cases.
2.

NegligentHiring, Retention, and Supervision of Clergy

In the wake of the Catholic Church's sexual abuse scandals, a tidal wave
of deserved litigation followed.1 06 The most common claims of institutional
liability focused on the Church's employment relationship with its
clergymen.1 07 Plaintiffs typically argued that the Church should be held
institutionally liable because (1) it hired these clergymen without performing
proper background checks; (2) once the Church learned that one of its
clergymen was a dangerous pedophile, it often allowed him to remain in the
clergy; and (3) it often left these known pedophiles unsupervised around
young children.1 08 These arguments encapsulate the torts of negligent hiring,
retention, and supervision.
By relying on these torts, the plaintiffs in these cases are asking courts to
declare that the Church's clergy-hiring practices were unreasonable and
punish the Church for improperly selecting its clergy.1 09 Unsurprisingly,

given the "delicate balance between religious freedom and the protection of

106. See Alana Bartley, Note, The Liability InsuranceRegulation ofReligious Institutions
After the Catholic Church Sexual Abuse Scandal, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 505, 514 (2010); Ira C.
Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and EcclesiasticalImmunity, 2004 BYU L. REV.
1789, 1792-93.
107. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 1847.
108. See, e.g., Roman Cath. Diocese v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213, 1241 (Miss. 2005)
(discussing that to hold the church liable for negligently hiring and retaining its clergy, a plaintiff
must prove (1) that the church knew or should have known that the clergyman was dangerous;
(2) the church, despite this danger, unreasonably employed this clergyman; and (3) the church's
hiring or retaining of this clergyman caused the plaintiff harm); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347,
361-62 (Fla. 2002); Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 515-16 (N.J. 1982).
To hold the Church liable for negligent supervision, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the
Church knew or should have known of its clergyman's dangerous propensities; (2) the Church
placed this clergyman in a position where he could do harm; (3) the Church unreasonably failed
to supervise the clergyman; and (4) this lack of supervision caused the plaintiff harm. See, e.g.,
Morrison, 905 So. 2d at 1241; Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 329 (Colo. 1993);

Novare Grp., Inc. v. Sarif, 718 S.E.2d 304, 309 (Ga. 2011);
AGENCY § 213 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1958).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

109. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 1847-48.
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the public safety, there is considerable diversity in the judicial analysis
employed by the ... courts" on this issue." 0
In Gibson v. Brewer, for example, the Supreme Court of Missouri held

that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prevents courts from assessing
whether a church's clergy-hiring processes are "reasonable.""' "Questions of
hiring, ordaining, and retaining clergy," the court reasoned, "necessarily
involve interpretation of religious doctrine, policy, and administration.""1 2
Delving into a church's clergy-hiring processes, the court continued, would
create an "excessive entanglement between church and state" and have "the
effect of inhibiting religion."" 3 Because the "ordination of a priest is
'quintessentially [a] religious matter,"' courts are not allowed to second-guess
the church's decision in this regard." 4 The Gibson court, in other words,
believed that the State could not-consistent with the First Amendment-tell
a church who it could and could not hire as a priest." 5
Similarly, in Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, the

Supreme Court of Maine held that churches are immune from suits involving
their clergy-hiring practices because imposing such "secular dut[ies]" would
"restrict [the church's] freedom to interact with its clergy in the manner
deemed proper by ecclesiastical authorities and would not serve a societal
interest sufficient to overcome the religious freedoms inhibited.""16 "[C]lergy
members cannot be treated in the law as though they were common law
employees," the court held." 7 "To import agency principles . .. into church
governance and to impose liability for any deviation from the secular standard
is to impair the free exercise of religion and to control denominational
governance."""
In Malicki v. Doe, however, the Florida Supreme Court reached the

opposite conclusion, holding that suits against religious institutions for
negligently hiring, retaining, and supervising their clergy may proceed

because these issues can be decided through the neutral application of tort
principles.119 The Malicki court noted there was nothing to suggest that
"committing sexual assault and battery was governed by [the defendant's]
sincerely held religious beliefs or practices."12 0 Rather, the church's
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Jane Doe I v. Malicki, 771 So. 2d 545, 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Gibsonv. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246-47 (Mo. 1997).
Id.
Id. at 247.
Id. (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 720 (1976)).
See id.
692 A.2d 441, 445 (Me. 1997).
Id.
Id.
814 So. 2d 347, 361-62 (Fla. 2002).
Id. at 360-61.
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challenged conduct related to employment practices that were not related to
its religious tenets or doctrine.121 Accordingly, the court reasoned that cases
of negligent employment practices can be decided "[t]hrough neutral
application of principles of tort law" and do not require courts to delve into or
question the defendant's religious convictions.1 22
Similarly, in Rashedi v. General Board of Church of Nazarene, the

Arizona Court of Appeals held that a church can be sued for its negligent
employment practices because the underlying issues can be determined
through "neutral and generally applicable" tort principles.1 23 The Rashedi
court noted that the only real issues in a suit for negligent hiring, retention,
and supervision are (1) whether the church knew its priest was dangerous and
(2) whether the church placed this priest in a position where he could harm
others.1 24 Resolving these issues "does not require the interpretation of
religious doctrine or ecclesiastical law."1 25 Rather, "it requires application of

tort law principles that are neutral and generally applicable."12
The rationales in these cases accurately illustrate the current divide among
courts on this issue. Courts that disallow suits regarding a church's clergyhiring practices typically focus on the relationship between church and priest.
They argue that the First Amendment "severely circumscribe[s] the role that
civil courts may play in resolving disputes involving religious organizations

or doctrine,"127 and courts that reach a contrary conclusion have "failed to
maintain the appropriate degree of neutrality" when dealing with religious
institutions.1 28 Courts that allow suits regarding a church's clergy-hiring
practices, on the other hand, typically focus on the neutrality and general
applicability of these torts.1 29

The following jurisdictions have disallowed suits that challenge a
church's clergy-hiring practices:
* Dausch v. Ryske, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994).
* Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mich.
1995).
* Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
121. See id. at 361.
122. Id.
123. 54 P.3d 349, 354 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).
124. See id. 354-55.
125. Id. at 354.
126. Id.
127. Swanson v. Roman Cath. Bishop, 692 A.2d 441, 443 (Me. 1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)).
128. Id. at 445.
129. See, e.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 361-62 (Fla. 2002); Moses v. Diocese of
Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320-21 (Colo. 1993); Rashedi, 54 P.3d at 354.
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Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441

(Me. 1997).
Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997).
Erdman v. Chapel Hill Presbyterian Church, 286 P.3d 357
(Wash. 2012).
" Pritzlaffv. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780 (Wis.
1995).
The following jurisdictions have allowed suits that challenge a church's
"
"

clergy-hiring practices:
" Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196

F.3d 409 (2d Cir. 1999).
"

Doe v. Norwich Roman CatholicDiocesan Corp., 268 F. Supp.

"

2d 139 (D. Conn. 2003).
Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73 (D.R.I. 1997).

"

Rashedi v. General Board of Church of Nazarene, 54 P.3d 349

"
*
*

(Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).
Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002).
Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
Knonkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).

*

Olson v. First Church of Nazarene, 661 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. Ct.

App. 2003).
*

Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d

*

1213 (Miss. 2005).
F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997).

*

Kenneth R.

*

N.Y.S.2d 791 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
Smith v. Privette, 495 S.E.2d 395 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).

*

Turner v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Burlington, Vermont, 987

v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 654

A.2d 960 (Vt. 2009).
There is a sharp divide among courts on this issue. Given this obvious
confusion and lack of guidance, the Supreme Court should step in and clarify
whether the First Amendment prevents courts from hearing cases that
challenge a religious institution's clergy-hiring practices. Part III of this
Article argues that when the Court (finally) decides to hear this issue, it should
hold that the First Amendment allows such suits to proceed.
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43
SHIELD

RELIGIOUS OFFICIALS FROM DEFAMATION LIABILITY

"But I tell you that every careless word that people speak, they shall give an
accountingfor it in the day ofjudgment."

-Matthew 12:36
The Court has consistently held that courts may hear suits against
religious institutions and their officials as long as they apply "neutral
principles of law" when deciding the case and "take special care to scrutinize
[church] document[s] in purely secular terms."1 30 For example, a churchlike any other employer-can be held vicariously liable if its pastor causes a
car accident while working for the church.' 3 ' Churches can also be sued for
basic slip-and-fall accidents.1 32 And church officials can be held liable for
intentionally inflicting emotional distress on their congregants. 33 As shown
in Part I of this Article, however, several jurisdictions have immunized church
officials from defamation suits when their allegedly defamatory statement was
made during a religious proceeding. These courts are seriously misguided.
In most defamation cases, courts will not be required to delve into
"questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice" that are outside the areas
of judicial expertise.1 34 Rather, whether a declarant uttered a false, harmful
statement will almost always turn on "objective, well-established" tort
principles that are "familiar to lawyers and judges" and can be determined
without reference to religious doctrine. 35
Take the case of Gaydos v. Blauer,136 for example. In Gaydos, a priest
and nun spread a rumor about the local Catholic school's elementary
principal, implying to multiple people that she "was having a sexual affair

130. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979); see Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches
of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Bowie v. Murphy, 624 S.E.2d 74, 78-79 (Va. 2006).
131. See, e.g., Whetstone v. Dixon, 616 So. 2d 764, 772 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Garber v.
Scott, 525 S.W.2d 114, 119-20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
132. See, e.g., Cox v. Thee Evergreen Church, 836 S.W.2d 167, 168-69 (Tex. 1992);
Garnierv. St. Andrew Presbyterian Church, 446 S.W.2d 607, 607-08 (Mo. 1969); Heathv. First
Baptist Church, 341 So. 2d 265, 266, 268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
133. See, e.g., Gulbraa v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints, 159 P.3d 392, 396 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). It is important to note, however, that IIED
claims against a church and its clergy cannot proceed if the court would be required to declare
that the institution's religious beliefs or practices are "extreme" or "outrageous." See Williams
v. Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses, 440 P.3d 820, 824-25 (Utah Ct. App. 2019).
134. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603.
135. See id.; Banks v. St. Matthew Baptist Church, 406 S.C. 156, 161, 750 S.E.2d 605,
607-08 (2013).
136. 81 S.W.3d 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
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with Father Ed Doyle." 3 7 This affair, the priest often said, left "a cloud
hanging over the school."' 38 The principal, of course, denied these
allegations.1 39 But not long after these rumors were spread, the principal was
terminated from her position at the school.14 0 After being sued for defamation,
the priest and nun argued the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine "prohibit[ed]
the exercise of jurisdiction by a secular court over these [defamation] claims
because the adjudication of such claims by a secular court [would] necessarily
submit[] the practice of their religion to the judgment of others outside their
religion."141

Perplexingly, the Missouri Court of Appeals agreed.1 42 "[T]o allow the
defamation claims to be litigated," the Gaydos court held, "would be to allow
civil court jurisdiction to enter the back door of the religious entity in question
and allow judicial probing of procedure and church polity."1 43 Because the
allegedly defamatory statements (1) were "generally made in connection
with . . decisions of the church officials" and (2) "were made by, to, and
about people who were part of the religious organization in question," the
statements "relate[d] to matters within the religious cognizance of the
diocese" and thus could not be examined by the courts.1 44
This decision makes absolutely no sense. In what world does the
statement "person X is having a sexual affair with person Y" have anything
to do with religious doctrine? Whether someone is having a sexual affair is a
non-religious statement of fact: either there is an affair or there is not. And
just because the declarant was wearing a priest's collar or a nun's habit when
they made this statement does not transform it into a religious statement. By
the Gaydos court's logic, the statements "person X murdered their spouse" or
"person X is a child molester" would be religious statements so long as they
were made by cleric near a church.
This sort of knee-jerk, formalistic, partisan reasoning has no place in a
secular democracy-let alone in an American courtroom. The ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine was meant to prevent courts from interpreting ambiguous
religious canons because such texts are outside most judges' judicial
expertise.1 45 The doctrine was not meant to give religious adherents free

license to spread malicious, damaging, and demonstrably false rumors about
others without consequence. In short, religious adherents should be held to the
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 189-90.
Id. at 189.
See id. at 188.
Id. at 188-89.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 196.
Id.
Id. at 196-97.
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 729 (1871).
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same standards as everyone else; "[t]o find otherwise would be to grant tort
law immunity to religious practitioners, enabling them to make any statement
regardless of its falsity and harmfulness provided the statement [was] made in
a religious setting."1

46

IV. THE ECCLESIASTICAL ABSTENTION DOCTRINE DOES NOT SHIELD
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS FROM LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENTLY HIRING,
RETAINING, OR SUPERVISING THEIR CLERGY

'"[B]othprophet andpriest are polluted; [e]ven in My house I have found
their wickedness,' declared the LORD."

-Jeremiah 23:11
In the wake of the Catholic Church's sexual abuse scandals, a tidal wave
of litigation followed.147 In addition to making claims against their abusers,
many of these victims attempted to hold the Church institutionally liable as
well.1 48 The most common claims of institutional liability revolved around the
Church's negligent employment practices.1 49 As shown in Part II of this
Article, however, several jurisdictions have immunized churches from claims
of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision of their clergy. This is baffling.
The American justice system should not allow any institution-regardless of
its religious affiliation-to leave unsupervised pedophiles near children
without the specter of civil liability.
The main argument running throughout this Article is that religious

institutions should not be given special treatment simply because of their
religious nature. Religion is not a trump card that allows groups to do grievous
harms without consequences. In fact, the opposite is typically true: granting
special privileges to religious tortfeasors improperly favors religion over non-

religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.1

0

Although the government

146. Banks v. St. Matthew Baptist Church, 406 S.C. 156, 163, 750 S.E.2d 605, 608 (2013).
147. Bartley, supra note 106, at 514.
148. Janna Satz Nugent, Note, A Higher Authority: The Viability of Third Party Tort
Actions Against a Religious Institution Grounded on Sexual Misconduct by a Member of the
Clergy, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 957, 960 (2003).
149. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 1845 ("Most of the cases brought against religious
organizations assert that such institutions are obliged to act with reasonable care in their
employment practices, especially when their employees will have significant interaction with
children or other vulnerable people.").
150. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)) (noting that the Establishment Clause
prevents the government from favoring one religion over others and from favoring religion over
non-religion); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) ("The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government . . effect
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is allowed to bestow "indirect" or "incidental" benefits to religious
organizations,' 5 ' it is not allowed to directly bestow a benefit that has the
primary effect of advancing religion.1 52 By granting religious institutions
immunity from several torts when such immunity is not available to nonreligious organizations, the government has improperly placed its stamp-of-

approval on the actions of religious organizations.
In her frequently cited concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice

O'Connor noted that "[t]he Establishment Clause prohibits government from
making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in
the political community."1 53 In other words, a person's religion, much like
their race or sex, should not be a part of the government's calculus when it
decides what treatment that person should receive.1 54 Lower court decisions
that prevent lawsuits against religious institutions solely because of their
religious affiliation run counter to this principle.
When the government gives an organization preferential treatment
because of its religious affiliation, it tells members of that religion that they
are "insiders"-"favored members of the political community" entitled to
special treatment because they believe the correct dogma.15 5 And, at the same
time, it tells non-members that they are "not full members of the political
community" who must play by a different set of rules because they do not
follow the correct dogma. 156 These decisions allow similarly situated groups
to receive vastly different treatment simply because of their religious
affiliations, or lack thereof. This sort of reasoning conflicts with the most basic
notions of fairness and equality enshrined in our Constitution. 157
no favoritism . . between religion and non-religion .... "); see also Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960) (per curiam) (noting protections against all forms of
governmental action, including both statutory law and court action through civil lawsuits);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1187-88 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that

the Establishment Clause plays a central role in guaranteeing religious freedom "by forbidding
official actions that signify official endorsement [of] . . . religious beliefs"); Zanita E. Fenton,
Faith in Justice: Fiduciaries,Malpractice & Sexual Abuse by Clergy, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
45, 68 (2001) (arguing that the "non-application of tort principles where they might otherwise
apply" could give rise to Establishment Clause concerns).
151. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973).
152. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1988); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.

602, 612 (1971).
153. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 687, 693-94.
155. Id. at 688.
156. Id.
157. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (noting that
the constitutional promise of equal protection "is essentially a direction that all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike" (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982))); Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974) (noting that equal protection principles are offended when the

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol72/iss1/5

22

Lindvall: Forgive Me, Your Honor, for I Have Sinned: Limiting the Ecclesias
2020]

FORGIVE ME, YOUR HONOR, FOR I HAVE SINNED

47

Imagine, for example, if a public school and a parochial school each
systematically employed pedophiles, placed them near children, and covered
up decades of abuse. Under some courts' interpretation of the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine, the public school could rightfully be sued into oblivion,
but the parochial school would remain immune from suit. Why? Because the
parochial school had "Saint" in its name? Or because the abuser wore a special
collar? Give me a break. Such formalistic reasoning has no place in a judicial
opinion.

Moreover, allowing plaintiffs to challenge a church's clergy-hiring
practices is consistent with the Court's free exercise jurisprudence. The Free
Exercise Clause was drafted primarily to prevent the persecution of religious
minorities1 58 and to prevent the states from coercing their citizens into
practicing a particular religion.1 59 When a church is sued for hiring pedophiles
and placing them near children without supervision, it is not being persecuted
for its religious beliefs; it is being sued for being objectively negligent and
irresponsible.1 60
As Professor Marci Hamilton observed, the justifications underlying the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine are "at their lowest ebb" in circumstances
where church officials "harm innocent and unconsenting third parties."161
Holding a religious institution civilly liable for child endangerment will not
discourage participation in the organization, belittle the organization's beliefs,
or require the court to delve into religious doctrine. To the contrary, holding
religious institutions to the same standard as everyone else shows that the
government is "remain[ing] neutral in the marketplace of ideas" 6 2 and is not

&

State treats "arguably indistinguishable" groups differently); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 690 (1973) (plurality opinion) (noting that "dissimilar treatment" between groups that are
"similarly situated" is the prototypical example of unconstitutional state action (quoting Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971))); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) ("[T]he equal
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."); see also Joseph Tussman
Jacobus tenBroek, The EqualProtectionofthe Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 344 (1949) (noting
that the Constitution requires the government to afford substantially equal treatment to similarly
situated groups).
158. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
532-33 (1993) (collecting historical sources).
159. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (quoting Lynchv. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 678 (1984)); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659-61 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part).
160. See Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 360-61 (Fla. 2002) (noting that sexual assault
and battery are not related to sincerely held religious beliefs or practices).
161. Marei A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public
Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099, 1114 (2004).
162. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978) (noting that it is a "central
tenant" of the First Amendment that the government must "remain neutral in the marketplace of
ideas").
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favoring religion over non-religion.1 63 Churches and their officials should not
be able to hide behind the First Amendment to avoid accountability for
conduct that is clearly unreasonable and harmful.
As a final note, in 2019, the Supreme Court readjusted its Establishment
Clause analysis in American Legion v. American Humanist Association by

adopting a more holistic, fact-specific approach that is meant to (1) assure
religious liberty, tolerance, and inclusivity; (2) avoid religiously based social
conflict; and (3) maintain an appropriate separation of church and state so that
each can flourish in their own separate spheres.1 64 Immunizing churches from
neutral, secular tort laws undermines these principles.
These churches, in many instances, knowingly employed pedophiles and
placed them around children without supervision.1 65 But, by the grace of the
courts, these abuse victims cannot hold the church liable simply because the
church played its religion trump card.1 66 This preferential treatment is bound
to create more religious intolerance and breed religiously based social
conflict. Imagine a community devastated by a church's child sex abuse
scandal. Imagine these victims courageously coming forward, banding
together, and turning to the courts for justice. Then, imagine the courts holding
that the church cannot be held liable simply because it is a church. Such a
superficial, unthinking, one-sided rationale has no place in our justice system,
and decisions like these breed only social strife and contempt for religion and
the judiciary.

163. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 702 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting
that the First Amendment forbids the government from "favor[ing] a particular religious sect"
or "promot[ing] religion over nonreligion"); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 694
(1970) ("[T]he Government must neither . . favor religion over nonreligion, nor sponsor a
particular sect, nor try to encourage participation in or abnegation of religion.").
164. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2082-85, 2089 (2019); id. at
2090-91 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005)
(Breyer, J., concurring)). The Court placed particular emphasis on avoiding the appearance of
government hostility toward religion. Id at 2084-85 (majority opinion) ("A government that
roams the land, tearing down monuments with religious symbolism and scrubbing away any
reference to the divine will strike many as aggressively hostile to religion.").
165. Bartley, supra note 106, at 509-10, 513.
166. John S. Brennan, The First Amendment is Not the 8th Sacrament: Exorcising the

EcclesiasticalAbstention DoctrineDefense from Legal andEquitable Claimsfor Sexual Abuse
Based on Negligent Supervision or Hiring of Clergy, 5 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L.
243, 254 (2002) (collecting cases).
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COUNTERARGUMENTS CONSIDERED

A.

Counterargument 1: By Becoming a Member of a Religious
Organization, an Individual Submits to the Organization's
EcclesiasticalJurisdictionand Forfeits Their Legal Right to Invoke
the Supervisory Power of the Civil Courts

Admittedly, members of religious organizations cannot turn to the civil
courts to address inherently ecclesiastical matters.167 For example, if a
church's bylaws provided that a congregant could be excommunicated only
by a two-thirds vote, a congregant expelled by a mere majority vote would
likely not be able to turn to the civil courts for reinstatement.1 68 The Supreme
Court has made clear that the civil courts must keep their noses out of a
religious organization's rules, regulations, doctrine, structure, and innerworkings.1 69 If the issue touches upon church governance, in other words, the
court must abstain and leave the issue to the church's leadership.17 0
However, the Supreme Court has never surrendered issues of civil rights
to ecclesiastical tribunals. '7' To the contrary, the Court has explicitly held that
the civil courts retain jurisdiction over cases that involve "neutral principles
of law" and do not touch upon church governance.1 72 The purpose of the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is to prevent courts from entangling
themselves in "questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice." 7 3 It is
not meant to immunize religious organizations from neutral, generally
applicable tort principles. '4
In its landmark decision in Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme

Court held that the First Amendment does not exempt religious persons or
groups from neutral, generally applicable laws, even if enforcing the law

167. Id. at 253.
168. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724-25 (1976)
(refusing to reinstate a wrongfully terminated bishop because the controversy touched upon the
"rules and regulations for internal [church] discipline and government").
169. See, e.g., id
170. See, e.g., id
171. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 731 (1871) ("When a civil right depends upon an
ecclesiastical matter, it is the civil court and not the ecclesiastical which is to decide. But the
civil tribunal tries the civil right, and no more, taking the ecclesiastical decisions out of which
the civil right arises as it finds them."). But see Gonzalez v. Roman Cath. Archbishop, 280 U.S.
1, 16 (1929) ("In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper
church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in
litigation before the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so
by contract or otherwise.").
172. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 599 (1979).
173. Id. at 603.
174. See id. at 599-600.
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Allowing religious groups to

excuse themselves from complying with valid laws, the Smith Court reasoned,
would "make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of
the land, and in effect . .. permit every citizen to become a law unto
himself."

76

Take an extreme case, for example. Suppose there was a radical sect of
Christianity in the United States that took the Bible's verses on stoning
literally.177 If the congregants stoned a man for "gathering wood on the
sabbath day," 78 could the stonee sue for battery? I would hope so. In a case
like this, the court would not be infringing on the group's religious practices;
it would be enforcing a general rule that all civil societies have adopted: you
can't throw rocks at people.
In the same vein, if courts held religious institutions liable for defamation
and negligent employment practices, they would not be infringing on their
religious practices; they would simply be enforcing two rules that all civil
societies have adopted: (1) you can't spread falsehoods about someone if it
would cause them to suffer serious harm and (2) you can't employ pedophiles
and leave them around children unsupervised. This is common sense.
B.

Counterargument 2: Allowing Defamation Suits Against Religious
Officials Would Require Courts to Declare that Certain Religious
Beliefs Are True or False

In a defamation case, the truth or falsity of a religious belief would arise
only in a rare case where the statement at issue is an assertion about religious
doctrine-in which case the court should abstain. Most defamation suits
revolve around declaratory statements that can be shown by a preponderance
175. 494 U.S. 872, 877-79 (1990).
176. Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
177. See, e.g., Leviticus 24:13-14 ("Then the LORD spoke to Moses, saying, 'Bring the
one who has cursed outside the camp, and let all who heard him lay their hands on his head; then
let all the congregation stone him."'); Deuteronomy 22:23-24 ("If there is a girl who is a virgin
engaged to a man, and another man finds her in the city and lies with her, then you shall bring
them both out to the gate of that city and you shall stone them to death .... "); Deuteronomy
17:2-7 ("If there is found in your midst, in any of your towns, which the LORD your God is
giving you, a man or a woman who does what is evil in the sight of the LORD your God . . then
you shall bring out that man or that woman who has done this evil deed to your gates . . and
you shall stone them to death.").
178. Numbers 15:32-36 ("[W]hile the sons of Israel were in the wilderness, they found a
man gathering wood on the sabbath day. Those who found him gathering wood brought him to
Moses . . and to all the congregation . . Then the LORD said to Moses, 'The man shall surely
be put to death; all the congregation shall stone him with stones outside the camp.' So all the
congregation brought him outside the camp and stoned him to death with stones, just as the
LORD had commanded Moses.").
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of the evidence to be true or false. 7 9 This, of course, is true even in cases
where the defendant is a religious official. Take the case of Downs v. Roman
CatholicArchbishop of Baltimore,180 for example. There, a seminarian sued

a priest for defamation after the priest accused the seminarian of "sexually
motivated [mis]conduct."181 These accusations, which the seminarian insisted
were false, caused the seminarian to be expelled from the diocese and
prevented him from ever being considered for the priesthood. 8 2
The Downs court dismissed the seminarian's defamation suit because the
statement was made by a priest in a setting concerning the priesthood.1 83 A
case of this sort, the court reasoned, would require the court to address "the
forbidden inquiry" of whether a person is worthy of being a member of the
clergy.' 84 But this framing of the issue completely misses the mark (and
provides immunity to church officials without due regard to the harms their
words can cause). The relevant inquiry in Downs was not whether the plaintiff

was suited to be a priest-that decision, of course, is left to the church council.
The relevant inquiry was whether the plaintiff engaged in sexual misconduct,
as the defendant claimed. This was a serious accusation made by the
defendant-an accusation that was either true or false-and the plaintiff
should have been allowed to hold the defendant accountable if his harmful
statement was demonstrably false.
Although certain statements may have a religious ring to them, this piety
may often be used to cloak the statement's secular purpose: to injure another.
"Joe violated God's Fourth Commandment," after all, is just a fancy way of
saying "Joe is a murderer." This is not a religious statement; it is a declarative
statement, which is either true or false, and courts should treat it as such. And
if these statements are demonstrably false and harmful, the declarant can (and
should) be held liable for uttering them.
Of course, courts cannot adjudicate the truth or falsity of all churchrelated statements. Contrast the statement "Father Jones stole $5,000 from the
church and should be removed from the priesthood" with "Father Jones is
untrustworthy and should be removed from the priesthood." Both statements
undoubtedly deal with Father Jones's fitness to serve as a priest and touch on
important ecclesiastical concerns; but the former statement is objective, and
the latter statement is subjective. The touchstone in a church-related
defamation case-like all defamation cases-should be whether the contested

179. See Andrew K. Craig, Note, The Rise in Press Criticism of the Athlete and the Future

ofLibel LitigationInvolvingAthletes andthe Press, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 527, 542 (1994).
180. 683 A.2d 808, 809 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
181. Id. at 813.
182. Id. at 810.
183. Id. at 813.
184. Id. at 812.
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statement can be proven to be demonstrably true or false in a court of law, not
whether it was uttered by a church official during a church proceeding.
C.

Counterargument3: EcclesiasticalTribunals Are Sufficient Forums
to Adjudicate Church-RelatedDisputes

Although ecclesiastical tribunals may be able to properly adjudicate some
church-related suits, in most cases they are woefully inadequate. Harvard law
professor Laurence Tribe has argued that by giving religious groups carte

blanche authority over church-based disputes, courts have committed the
fallacy of assuming "internal fairness."1 85 Courts have "assum[ed], without
any real inquiry, that the internal processes of the groups to which litigants
are remitted will give fair consideration to the interests and rights of such
litigants."1 86 In other words, when someone feels wronged by an institution,
it does not make much sense to require them to turn to that same institution
for justice.18 7 And when these tribunals prove to be insufficient-either
because of impartiality, incompetence, or poor judicial structure-the civil
courts should remain open to wronged individuals. To quote Professor Tribe:
Even when ...

dealing with religious freedom, where the argument

for deferring to the internal autonomy of private groups is perhaps
strongest, there remains a clear need . . for a neutral judicial forum
to protect persons against the complete disregard of their rights by an
organization in whose internal structure they have not received a fair
opportunity to make their case.1 88

This is especially true in cases concerning a cleric's defamation or a
church's negligent employment practices. To remit a claimant to the church's
tribunals, the claimant is faced with the uphill battle of asking the church to
either (1) declare that one of its clerics is a liar or (2) admit that it was
negligent in hiring its clergy member. This is very unlikely to happen.

Churches should not be allowed to police themselves, as "the adversar[ial]
process is needed . . . to maintain the delicate balance between undue
intrusion into the internal lives of various autonomous groups and undue

delegation to those groups of potentially tyrannical authority over their
members."1 89
185. Laurence H. Tribe, Seven PluralistFallacies:In Defense ofthe Adversary Process
A Reply to Justice Rehnquist, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 43, 47, 49-50 (1978).
186. Id. at 47.
187. See id. at 47, 50.
188. Id. at 50.
189. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION

In 1998, Diane Witthaus was slandered and, as a result, lost her job as an
elementary school principal.1 90 Throughout the 1980s, Paul Isley was
routinely sexually abused by the teachers at his school.191 These two turned
to the courts for justice, but they were both turned away.1 92 Their victimizers
could not be held accountable, the courts told them.1 93 Why? Because they
were priests.1 94 These courts held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine

(1) prevents religious organizations from being held liable for their negligent
clergy-hiring practices and (2) immunizes religious officials from many
defamation suits.1 95 These courts reached their conclusions despite the fact
that the Supreme Court has never ruled on-or even hinted at-these issues.
And these courts are not alone. Multiple jurisdictions have ruled that
religious institutions cannot be held liable for the negligent hiring, retention,
or supervision of their clergy because these institutions are shielded from
liability under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.1 96 And even more
jurisdictions have held that this doctrine prevents religious officials from
being sued for defamation if the defamatory statement was made during a
religious proceeding.1 97 These decisions are horribly misguided. An
institution should not be shielded from legitimate, generally applicable tort
laws simply because it has a religious affiliation. In fact, giving such an
obvious benefit solely to religious institutions conflicts with the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause and equal protection jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court's current lack of clarity in this area has allowed
multiple courts to rule that religious institutions cannot be held liable for
knowingly placing pedophiles near children without supervision.1 98 This is
head-spinning. The Supreme Court should revisit the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine and make clear that (1) it allows religious officials to be sued for
defamation, even if the defamatory statement was made during a religious
proceeding and (2) it allows religious institutions to be held liable for their
negligent employment practices, especially when they allow dangerous

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See State ex rel. Gaydos v. Blaeuer, 81 S.W.3d 186, 189-90 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
See Isley v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1142 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
See id. at 1150-51; Gaydos, 81 S.W.3d at 198.
Isley, 880 F. Supp at 1150-51; Gaydos, 81 S.W.3d at 198.
See Isley, 880 F. Supp at 1150; Gaydos, 81 S.W.3d at 196-97.
Isley, 880 F. Supp at 1150-51; see Gaydos, 81 S.W.3d at 196-97.
Brennan, supra note 166, at 254.
See supra Section II.B.1; see also Carl H. Esbeck, Tort ClaimsAgainst Churches and

EcclesiasticalOfficers: The First Amendment Considerations, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 92-94

(1986).
198. See Brennan, supra note 166, at 253-54.
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members of their clergy to be around children unsupervised. To find otherwise
would be to grant religious institutions a license to sin without consequence.
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